USA லேபிளுடன் இடுகைகளைக் காண்பிக்கிறது. அனைத்து இடுகைகளையும் காண்பி
USA லேபிளுடன் இடுகைகளைக் காண்பிக்கிறது. அனைத்து இடுகைகளையும் காண்பி

ஞாயிறு, 7 ஜூலை, 2013

USA, India, UNHRC answerable to provincial meddling in Sri Lanka

Feature Article
2ND LEAD

USA, India, UNHRC answerable to provincial meddling in Sri Lanka

[TamilNet, Saturday, 06 July 2013, 23:56 GMT]However condemned by Eezham Tamils, the USA and India have committed on several occasions to ‘provincial’ solutions to the national crisis of Eezham Tamils. The ‘provincial’ wording has also got into the UNHRC resolution, tabled and fine-tuned by the two and passed by 47 Establishments. But, what do they say for Colombo’s current meddling in creating a new Sinhala division, Weli-oya, in the Northern Province, by altering district boundaries and thus endangering the province’s demographic security and contiguity, ask Eezham Tamil civil service circles in the island. While official survey maps show that the Vavuniyaa district of the Northern Province has a boundary with the East, it is now erased out in the 2012 census map, while Anuradhapura will fill the gap.
Administrative map
Sri Lanka Administrative Map showing no common boundary between Mullaith-theevu and Anuradhapura districts. This is clearly shown in the official Survey Department maps too.
Census map Mullaiththeevu
The Census Map of 2012 showing Weli-oya, a recently created and colonized division of the Mullaith-theevu district as an exclusive Sinhala division. The division has now wedged the contiguity between the Tamil districts Vavuniyaa in the Northern Province and Trincomalee in the Eastern Province, while it established contiguity with the Sinhala district Anuradhapura in the North Central Province.


The Weli-oya division in the Mullaith-theevu district of the Northern Province, newly created for the exclusive purpose of Sinhalicisation of a strategic piece of Tamil Land in order to wedge the North from the East, has been carved out by joining territories of the Mullaith-theevu district as well as territories of the Vavuniyaa district.

This has been done in such a way, so that Vavuniyaa would lose its boundary with Trincomalee and the Sinhalicised Weli-oya will have contiguity with Anuradhapura district of the North Central Province.

No Tamil civil servant in the Northern Province actually knows now what are the district boundaries and what are the village boundaries in the so-called Weli-oya division of the Mullaith-theevu district. No officials’ conferences related to the division invites any Tamil officials. Such conferences don’t take place in the Northern Province either.

All data related to Weli-oya is totally blacked out in the official web portal of Colombo’s Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs. In the 2012 Northern Province Statistical Handbook, 9 GSO (village level) divisions are listed under the Weli-oya division, but without proper code numbers due for such GSOs.

Only the map now released by the 2012 Census Commission shows that the Weli-oya division is a 100 per cent Sinhala division in the Mullaith-theevu district and it has a common boundary with the Anuradhapura district of the North Central Province.

Earlier the Mullaith-theevu district didn’t have a common boundary with Anuradhapura. Providing common boundary for Sinhala-colonised Weli-oya of Mullaith-theevu with the Sinhala NW province became possible only by wedging the contiguity of the Tamil districts of Vavuniyaa and Trincomalee.

The new division has been carved out in such a way so that all the potential tanks and arable lands will go the Sinhalese brought in to colonise the division.

Colombo is thoroughly opposed to ethnic divisions to protect Tamils in the Ampaa’rai district in the East. It has not earlier protected the identity of Tamils and Muslims in the Puththa’lam and Kurunegala districts of the North Western Province also.

There can’t be ethnic territories in the island says presidential sibling Gotabhaya and the genocidal regime. But how could an exclusive Sinhala division has been created in the Tamil province, so quickly within the last couple of years, and who is answerable to this, ask Tamils for alternative politics in the island.

The USA, India and the UN are answerable to so many crimes committed against Eezham Tamils as the entire genocide, which they are not prepared to accept, has now largely been perceived by Tamils as something that had been designed and executed by no one but the former two and the third one endorsing it.

But what is now happening even to the province for which they had committed is just another explicit example for the entire world and for those among the Tamils who still look upon to them to realise what these elements are really up to, commented Tamils for alternative politics in the island.

சனி, 11 மே, 2013

UK author eulogising Sri Lanka COIN backfires exposing USA

UK author eulogising Sri Lanka COIN backfires exposing USA

[TamilNet, Friday, 10 May 2013, 20:02 GMT]
While Sri Lanka’s genocidal war on the Eezham Tamils architected by world powers, being reduced to only ‘human rights abuses’ in the criticism by political actors within the Establishments, it is studied by military experts within the same system to ‘learn lessons’ in counterinsurgency (COIN). The latest is a COIN literature on Sri Lanka, ‘Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers’ by British analyst Paul Moorcraft, which adds to the myth of a ‘successful innovative Sri Lanka COIN’, while covering up the genocide executed by GoSL. But, it exposes the various measures taken by the US-led powers to break the Tamils’ struggle, including advise by the Pacific Command to the GoSL as early as in 2002 to use cluster bombs. When the US-led West's military mindset is such an approval to the SL model, its ‘rights abuses’ talk is just a strategic façade, realize Tamil activists.

Published by Pen & Sword Books and released on February 2013, the blurb to ‘Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers: The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka’s Long War’ claims that the conclusions and findings of the book are “the most authoritative, objective and closely researched account of this savage civil war to date.”

The author, Dr. Paul Moorcraft, British military and foreign policy analyst, a war correspondent with considerable experience and a former senior instructor at the Royal Military Academy-Sandhurst and the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, however does not hide on which side his ‘objectivity’ lies.

Be it citing from a CIA summary to show that the first Sinhalese arrived to the island in 6th Century BC while giving the image of Tamils as invaders, citing extensively from the Sinhala military and state’s reports while dismissing reports from Tamils’ side as “propaganda war fought in the media”, publishing self-taken photos of ‘rehabilitated’ former Tigers and ‘hearts and minds’ operations, or the tacit downplaying of GoSL massacres and bombings of Tamil civilians while taking care to cite GoSL sources on LTTE attacks, the author makes it clear where he stands.
Book cover
Thankfully, the author claims that “This analysis is not a moral tract.”

His obvious bias apart, his presentation the Sri Lankan model of COIN should be an object of inquiry.

While he demonizes the LTTE leadership with analogies to Pol Pot, al-Qaeda and Nazis in passing commentary, in his military analyst mode, he studies the LTTE’s functioning by drawing parallels with the North Vietnamese/Maoist style insurgency.

Incidentally, prior to American involvement in the Afghanistan and the middle-east, Western military thinkers directed their greatest efforts to creating a COIN model to check the above insurgency styles.

The author states in the introduction that “it was the first time since the end of the Second World War that a large-scale indigenous insurgency had been defeated by force of arms,” and further that “If the peace is truly permanent, the conflict may well teach other nations how to end wars and bring peace.”

He concludes, after 168 pages of mostly praise for the GoSL’s military strategy, “Without getting involved in a semantic discussion about the precise nature of the conflict, the utility of examining how the government won should be apparent to all those who study wars and how they end.”

For a book whose unstated objective seems to be to give an obituary of the Eezham Tamils’ armed struggle, the author seems to forget the crucial lesson in COIN, as espoused by classical western COIN theorists like David Galula – that COIN is successful only if it wins on the military and the political fronts.

While the genocidal Sri Lankan state has successfully occupied the Tamil homeland post-2009, subjecting the Eezham Tamils to structural genocide through militarization, Sinhalization and routinization of physical and psychological abuse, the Tamil diaspora, especially the second generation youth are getting stronger on their identity and are challenging the Sri Lankan government and its abettors in several forums and protests.

Post-Mu’l’livaaykkaal has seen a phenomenal upsurge of pro-Tamil Eelam political activism in Tamil Nadu, largely involving students, but also IT professionals, lawyers, social activists, civil society and political parties. The recent student protests against the pro-LLRC US resolution have not just been the largest demonstration in Tamil Nadu after the anti-Hindi agitations in the 60s, they have also been the largest student protest in India in the recent times. These protests have not only strengthened the political discourse regarding Tamil Eelam in Tamil Nadu, they have also brought about a resolution in the Tamil Nadu assembly demanding a referendum among the Eezham Tamils.

The protests in Tamil Nadu are also unique for the fact that at no point in history have the symbolisms of the Eezham Tamils’ liberation struggle been so popular and so widely accepted among society, cutting across caste and class barriers.

Even as the GoSL brutally curbs protestors in the Eezham Tamils’ homeland through force and intimidation, Tamil mass demonstrations in Tamil Nadu and across the globe are gaining momentum on conceptual grounds, unwavering on the political solution of Tamil Eelam that the ‘Tamil insurgents’ stood for.

What is an even more jarring truth is that the west-advised ‘hearts and minds’ strategy approach was also defeated by the Tamil civilians in the Vanni who moved with the LTTE instead of moving over to the government side, and who bore the brunt of the GoSL assaults both during and after the war.

* * *

Moorcraft’s integration of the international involvement in Sri Lanka’s war on the Tamils is an interesting patchwork. While playing down the full extent of military advice and assistance that Washington-New Delhi combine gave to Sri Lanka so as give the GoSL an image of an innovator in COIN, he inadvertently gives examples of how the war would not have been possible without the help of these powers, including of course, the extensive military and technical aid provided by Israel, Pakistan, Russia and China.

He quotes Gotabaya, “Unless we had won the support of the Indian government, we couldn’t have won this war”, giving examples of how New Delhi gave the green signal to Colombo to finish the war while playing image games to manipulate Tamil Nadu.

Citing Air Chief Marshal Roshan Goonetileke, he shows how the US stopping LTTE’s procurement of SAM-18s, a more advanced surface to air missile, assisted the Sri Lanka Air Force to conduct their operations more freely.

Moorcraft, deeply interested in the naval tactics of the Sea Tigers, also notes how joint Indian and US intelligence helped Sri Lanka destroy LTTE’s Pigeon ships and how America urged the EU to ban the LTTE.

Likewise, the author explicitly portrays the desire of the US to see the LTTE defeated and its concomitant assistance and advice to Sri Lanka.

Some relevant excerpts:

“Also, in 2002, the US Department of Defense had sent Colombo a lengthy report compiled by a US Pacific Command team. Its numerous recommendations impressed Gotabaya Rajapaksa. They included the need for a combined national security council operating a clear national strategy; before the armed services had tended to fight their own wars in their own ways.”

“The Americans, while praising the fighting spirit of the infantry, criticized the fact that many soldiers lacked even basics such as helmets and body armour.”

“Much equipment was needed for naval operations, too. The Americans had correctly identified the supply of arms by sea as the LTTE’s centre of gravity (although traditional COIN theory usually would select the population, the sea in which the fish swim).”

“The Sri Lankan forces needed better armed and bigger ships but, equally important, the equipment had to fit into a new combined arms strategy.”

“The security forces had to be prepared for conventional full manoeuvre warfare in places like Vanni, but also classic counter-insurgency operations in areas of mixed support, as well as conducting counter-terrorism in urban areas, particularly Colombo.”

“Americans also urged the Sri Lankans to improve their night fighting capability, especially the air force, which required upgraded avionics and guided weapons.”

“The Americans pointed out that instead of buying MiG-27s money could have been better spent upgrading the Kfir fighters.”

“The Pacific Command also recommended the use of cluster bombs.”

The Sri Lankan government used this advice and a lot more to the best of its genocidal abilities.

But in an irony only the US is capable of, Admiral Robert F. Willard, US Navy Commander of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) said in a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 2012 that “USPACOM’s engagement with Sri Lanka will continue to be limited, until the Government of Sri Lanka demonstrates progress in addressing human rights allegations.”

In a report to the same Committee this year on April, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, US Navy Commander of USPACOM from March 2012, said “Sri Lanka needs to work to move past its recent history and reconcile a nation divided by many years of civil war.”

In the same report however, he rather openly hinted at the US plans in the region.

“Pacific Air Force’s Operation PACIFIC ANGEL and Pacific Fleet’s PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP are two examples that bring joint, combined and nongovernmental organizations together to deliver cooperative health engagements, engineering civic action programs and subject matter expert exchanges to many nations, specifically in areas like Oceania, Sri Lanka, and Laos – opening doors that would otherwise be closed to a U.S. military presence.”

* * *

Paul Moorcraft’s approach to Sri Lanka seems to be indicative of a tendency among the military minds in the West, especially the US, on the lessons to be learnt for COIN at large from the ‘Sri Lanka solution’.

While state police forces and right-wing media in India, the local partner in the genocide, keep hailing the ‘Sri Lanka solution’ as appropriate to deal with the Maoist insurgency, influential military thinkers in the US appear to be doing a professional, scientific study of the Sri Lankan model and its applicability to other contexts.

Scheduled to be released in a few months from now is military expert Ahmed S. Hashim’s ‘When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers’.

Besides having a profile of having taught subjects on military and strategic studies at the US Naval War College, and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, incidentally the same institution where Sri Lankan ‘military expert’ Rohan Gunaratna teaches, Dr. Hashim is considered to be the main expert advising Pentagon on COIN in Iraq.

His book ‘Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq’ is a popular among both US military personnel and experts dealing with the conflict.

The advertising blurb of Hashim’s to be released book on Sri Lanka and the LTTE claims to be an analysis of “The first successful counterinsurgency campaign of the twenty-first century.”

The advertisement claims that the book “investigates those questions in the first book to analyze the final stage of the Sri Lankan civil war. When Counterinsurgency Wins traces the development of the counterinsurgency campaign in Sri Lanka from the early stages of the war to the later adaptations of the Sri Lankan government, leading up to the final campaign. The campaign itself is analyzed in terms of military strategy but is also given political and historical context—critical to comprehending the conditions that give rise to insurgent violence.”

Further, “The tactics of the Tamil Tigers have been emulated by militant groups in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Whether or not the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency campaign can or should be emulated in kind, the comprehensive, insightful coverage of When Counterinsurgency Wins holds vital lessons for strategists and students of security and defense.”

Dr. Hashim was also a participant at Sri Lanka Army’s Defence Seminar on ‘Defeating Terrorism: Sri Lankan Experience’ held from 31 May to 2 June, 2011, where, after congratulating the Sri Lankan state for its “remarkable achievement” for winning “the first counter insurgency victory of the 21st century”, he gave the GoSL advice “to counter the non-state actor with their own media narrative, prior to the conflict, during the conflict and particularly after the conflict,” using terms like reconstruction and reconciliation.

This ‘development’, ‘reconstruction’ and ‘reconciliation’ approach, interestingly, is still the approach taken by US-Indian establishments at Geneva.

* * *

Speaking at the same seminar was Dr. David Kilcullen, Australian born COIN expert.

Dr. Kilcullen, a former Chief Strategist at the Office of Counterterrorism at the US State department, is one of the biggest names in the modern Western COIN industry, whose 28 articles on ‘Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency’ are found as an appendix to the US Field Manual 3-24.2, ‘Tactics in Counterinsurgency’ released in April 2009.

Speaking at the Seminar, Kilcullen was of the opinion that “The defeat of the Tamil Tigers represents an extremely important achievement that needs to be discussed and studied in detail.”

The laudatory remarks on GoSL’s ‘resettlement’ of IDPs, the LLRC and dismissive comments on HR violations allegations apart, Dr. Kilcullen’s crucial point is the lesson that he picks from Sri Lanka and presents to the world of COIN.

He argues that Sri Lanka’s victory “has led some people in the counterinsurgency community to question the basic precepts of classical counterinsurgency as understood in the West which advocates protecting the population and focusing on political primacy as a means to win over the population and isolate the insurgent and forge a lasting peace.”

Further, “Sri Lanka in this case shows a different path, somewhat in contradiction to these prescriptions and produced both quick and decisive results. Firstly, counterinsurgency is at its heart - a counter adaptation level - a struggle to develop and apply new techniques in a fast moving high threat environment against an enemy that's continually updating and developing. Counterinsurgency isn't defined by a single, specific set of techniques rather a combination of techniques used for a particular insurgency under particular circumstances. Sri Lanka's approach embodied that principle.”

Most ironically, in his book ‘Counterinsurgency’ published in 2010, Dr. Kilcullen had advocated that “Scrupulously moral conduct, alongside political legitimacy and respect for the rule of law, are thus operational imperatives: they enable victory, and in their absence no amount of killing—not even genocidal brutality, as in the case of Nazi antipartisan warfare, described below—can avert defeat.”

That Sri Lanka flouted all of the above and engaged in one of the worst genocidal brutalities of the 21st Century is fact well known to Kilcullen and the establishment that he is part of.

But yet, when influential COIN and military experts in the establishments like Kilcullen and Hashim praise the successes of Sri Lanka’s war on the Tamil people, overlooking the genocide and the concomitant political fallout in Tamil Nadu and the diaspora, and while the various HR reports produced by those NGOs and State Departments in the same establishments only engage in counting the trees without addressing the question of genocide, nationhood, and sovereignty of the Eezham Tamil nation, it is hard not to think that they are two sides of the same coin.

Likewise, criticism of Sri Lanka’s model as a deviation from classical COIN and as one that should not be ever admired, let alone emulated elsewhere has been made by some COIN writers in journals like Small Wars. But these writers are not of the profile or rank of a Kilcullen or a Hashim, who suggest that positive lessons can be taken from the Sri Lankan experience for COIN in general. If this is going to continue to be the case, then Tamils as a whole can arrive at no other conclusion but that the global COIN game played by the US led establishments that caused the genocide in May 2009 is still working against them.

சனி, 16 மார்ச், 2013

USA continues to harp on implementing Sri Lanka's LLRC

USA continues to harp on implementing Sri Lanka's LLRC

[TamilNet, Friday, 15 March 2013, 13:21 GMT]
Seeing a ‘broad spectrum of recommendations’ in the so-called Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) of Sri Lanka, the delegation representing the USA at the UPR review sessions of the UN Human Rights Council on Friday continued to harp on Sri Lanka's own LLRC, avoiding any reference to international investigations on Sri Lanka. The US position was only differeniating between the internal mechanisms of Sri Lanka, namely the National Action Plan and the LLRC.

The US statement said Colombo was lobbying other delegations to revise their UPR recommendations to exclude reference to the LLRC report after they had been orally presented.

Conceding that Sri Lanka has rejected nearly all recommendations regarding engagement and cooperation with UN special procedures mandate holders, the US delegation led by Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe was urging the Sri Lankan government to ‘expeditiously implement both the UPR and LLRC recommendations’.

There was no mention to the underlying conflict in the US presentation.

Full text of the US Statement follows:

Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America
 As Delivered by Ambassador Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe

Human Rights Council 22nd Session
Geneva
March 15, 2013   The United States welcomes the return of the delegation of Sri Lanka to the Council and appreciates the opportunity to comment on their response to the UPR review.

We welcome the Government’s statement of its intention to accept recommendations to combat gender-based violence, to carry out an independent and credible investigation into the allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and to strengthen the independence of institutions, including the Human Rights Commission, Police Commission, and Election Commission. During the review, a number of States called for the implementation of the recommendations of Sri Lanka’s own Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). 

We are disappointed that the Government rejected all UPR recommendations from States that called upon it to implement the LLRC recommendations. Further, the Sri Lankan delegation attempted to reframe Sri Lanka’s human rights commitments in terms of the government’s National Plan of Action, which does not address the broad spectrum of recommendations put forward by the LLRC report, and by lobbying other delegations to revise their UPR recommendations to exclude reference to the LLRC report after they had been orally presented. Major changes were made to the substance of recommendations after the interactive dialogue. This is inconsistent with the transparent, interactive character of the UPR.  We are also disappointed that the Government rejected nearly all recommendations regarding engagement and cooperation with UN special procedures mandate holders. We urge the government to expeditiously implement both the UPR and LLRC recommendations.

Chronology:

வெள்ளி, 8 மார்ச், 2013

USA releases draft resolution

USA releases draft resolution for discussion in Geneva

[TamilNet, Thursday, 07 March 2013, 13:16 GMT]
On the 22nd session of UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) taking place in Geneva from 25 February to 22 March, a draft of the resolution to be tabled by the USA on Sri Lanka, has been released for discussion on Thursday, news sources in Geneva said providing scanned version of the draft to media.



Chronology:

வியாழன், 7 மார்ச், 2013

Colombo reaches ‘understanding’ with USA, claims Sinhala daily

Colombo reaches ‘understanding’ with USA, claims Sinhala daily

[TamilNet, Thursday, 07 March 2013, 07:09 GMT]
Sinhala daily Divaina, which is a sister news paper of The Island, published by Upali Newspapers in Colombo, has stated in a recent news report citing ‘reliable’ sources that Colombo had reached a mutual understanding with Washington on the implementation of LLRC and monitoring its implementation through a Rajapaksa-appointed Commission of Colombo. According to the paper, the USA had promised to Colombo that it would refrain from imposing sanctions on Sri Lanka through UN Security Council until 2016. Last week, the External Affairs Minister of the New Delhi Establishment in the Indian parliament ‘encouraged’ the USA and Sri Lanka “to directly engage on the draft resolution and aim for a mutually acceptable outcome.”

Journalist Keerthy Warnakulasuriya, writing in Divaina on 03 March 2013, further claims that the understanding was reached prior to the SL delegation leaving Colombo for Geneva.

Mr Warnakularsuriya further writes that Colombo had agreed to permit the USA to review the progress on LLRC implementation on an annual basis.

In the meantime, informed circles in Geneva on Wednesday told TamilNet that there is nothing new in the draft and that certain countries, like Egypt, were pushing for dropping specifics in the already watered-down draft currently in circulation.

In addition to the rejection of the territoriality of Eezham Tamils in the island, Colombo’s LLRC report has fixed 2020 as the year to complete the structural genocide of Eezham Tamils as a nation, through the deceptive ‘Trilingual Initiative’.

The LLRC denies even the existence of ethnic districts in the island.

Informed circles say that the US resolution in Geneva may mention non-descript ‘devolution’ of powers but will not deal with the status of Eezham Tamils as a nation or even as an ethnicity.

The signal from Washington has already made it clear that the CJ impeachment issue (State reformation) is more important than the issue of genocide in the island.

The resolution will provide full green signal to Colombo to continue in full speed the annihilation of Eezham Tamils as a nation having territoriality in the island, the sources said. Both New Delhi and Washington must have already received the ‘payments’ for their services in this year’s session of the UNHRC, the informed sources said.

In keeping the sides–committing genocide and facing it–silent, the USA now need not worry about the Sinhalese, and about Tamils the USA is thoroughly confident about its control on the diaspora, Tamil parliamentary politicians in the island, mainstream parties in Tamil Nadu and the machinations of New Delhi, the sources further said, adding that the ultimate aim of talking Soft Power - Hard Power formula is to blunt the People’s Power.

* * *


The Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, said the following during the parliamentary debate in New Delhi on last Wednesday:

“I would like to inform the august House that we understand that a follow up procedural Resolution on Sri Lanka is likely to be proposed by USA for consideration at the forthcoming session of the UNHRC in Geneva in March 2013. At this juncture, we would encourage the United States and Sri Lanka to directly engage on the draft resolution and aim for a mutually acceptable outcome. Needless to add, our decision on a potential resolution in the forthcoming meeting of the Human Rights Council will await the outcome of these efforts and would depend on the substance of the resolution finally tabled.”

* * *


Excerpts from the LLRC recommendations revealing what is actually aimed by the implementation of them, i.e., the annihilation of the identity of Eezham Tamils as a nation of its territory in the island:

The following excerpts, showing how unambiguous the recommendations are in the structural genocide of Eezham Tamils, are brought out here for the benefit of the gullible arguing in favour of the implementation of the LLRC recommendations.

On the language identity of the nation of Eezham Tamils:

No district or province should be categorized in terms of language (LLRC 8.240)

The Commission also recommends that the government should have a pro-active of policy to encourage mixed schools serving children from different ethnic and religious background. In this regard the Government should develop a carefully conceived policy facilitating the admission of children from different ethnic and religious groups to these schools (LLRC: 8.250)

The Commission therefore welcomes the Government initiative for a trilingual nation by the year 2020 (LLRC: 8.239)

On power-sharing:

While the distribution of meaningful powers to the periphery is essential, there are powers, which form the core responsibilities of the State and which cannot be so devolved, and need to be retained and exercised by the Government at the centre. It is also important to ensure that any power sharing arrangement has inbuilt mechanisms that would effectively address and discourage secessionist tendencies and safeguard the sovereignty and integrity of the State. (LLRC: 8.224)

On land and homeland of Eezham Tamils:

The view was also expressed that no part of Sri Lanka belonged to any ethnic group. It was stated that due to terrorist activities, Sinhalese people from the North and East had been chased away, and that these people should be taken and resettled in the North (LLRC: 8.107)

The Commission is of view that the Government should expedite action on the establishment of a National Land Commission (NLC) in order to propose appropriate future national land policy guidelines (LLRC 6.104.12)

On the war and reputation of Sinhala Army:

In evaluating the Sri Lanka experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL, the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived, in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority (LLRC 4.262)

The Commission finds that there are troubling technical and forensic questions of a serious nature that cast significant doubts about the authenticity of this video and the credibility and reliability of its content. It is also observed that trauma evident on the bodies of victims does not appear to be consistent with the type of weapon used and the close range at which the firing is seen to have taken place (LLRC 4.374 e)

It is also the obligation of the Government to clear the good name and protect the honour and professional reputation of soldiers who defended the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and particularly the many thousands of soldiers who perished carrying out their combat duties cleanly and professionally against a widely condemned terrorist group who used most inhumane tactics in combat (LLRC 4.376)

திங்கள், 3 டிசம்பர், 2012

Tamil parties missed directing USA on LLRC: Gajendrakumar

Tamil parties missed directing USA on LLRC: Gajendrakumar

[TamilNet, Monday, 03 December 2012, 01:22 GMT]
Had the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) been firm on the stand of Eezham Tamils, the USA couldn’t have ended up with the LLRC solution at Geneva, but the TNA blindly backed the US resolution at Geneva. It is after the Geneva resolution the land grab and the structural genocide of Eezham Tamils by the Sri Lankan state got accelerated, said former TNA parliamentarian and TNPF leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam in his second part of interview to TamilNet's Palaka'ni, covering current political situation of Eezham Tamils. The US-backed resolution was passed in Geneva essentially to resolve the Tamil issue in the island, but it is not serving the Tamil issue, he further said.



Mr Glenn Mc Mohan for TamilNet interviewed Mr. Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam in London, when he had come for the British Tamil Forum (BTF) conference in mid November.

Our position is that the LLRC recommendations have to be rejected in toto. Even the TNA initially came out with a comprehensive rejection of the LLRC recommendations. But the God only knows how they started welcoming it later, Gajendrakumar said.

Describing the current situation faced by Eezham Tamils as one that of multi-faceted genocide, Gajendrakumar elucidated on the accelerated process of land grab, militarisation, colonisation and Sinhalicisation of the territory of Eezham Tamils in the island in the last three years.

He highlighted the planned affliction inflicted on the Eezham Tamil fishing communities resulting in Eezham Tamils losing the coastal stretch of their territory.

Out of the total 20 odd divisions of SL military, 18 divisions are stationed in the North and East of the island and 15 of the divisions are deployed in the North alone, Gajendrakumar said, explaining the gravity of occupied militarisation in the territory of Tamils.

“I can’t go to any house and meet people without the military coming there,” he said on the nature of SL-occupied militarisation in the country of Eezham Tamils.

The ultimate aim is to deconstruct Tamils as a nation in the island. Sri Lanka will be happy to reduce Tamils into a minority. This is nothing but genocide. The International Community knows this well, the TNPF leader said.

Answering a question on allowing time to Colombo, he said that when you look at what is happening and if you still give time, then the time is for some agenda.

According the Gajendrakumar, International outfits talking only of the war crimes of the present regime is meaningless. War crimes took place for 30 years and even before.

Our experience is that the genocidal policies started ever since the British left the island.

As far as Eezham Tamils were concerned, every regime of post-British Colombo was the worst at its own time.

What is happening today is a terror campaign to make Tamils to withdraw their struggle and to make weird people to take over the leadership. We believe in the opposite, Gajendrakumar said, adding that the responsibility to change things on the ground is vested with the people.

Commenting on the BTF resolution pronouncing the genocide faced by Eezham Tamils, Gajendrakumar said that it was a landmark resolution in content and in the composition of the people who made it, as it was jointly made by people from the island, from the diaspora and from Tamil Nadu.

However, he came out with a note of caution that the resolution is meaningful only when they stay true to it.

Chronology:

செவ்வாய், 15 மே, 2012

India, USA denying fundamentals reduce Tamils to discuss 13 Amendment

India, USA denying fundamentals reduce Tamils to discuss 13 Amendment

[TamilNet, Monday, 14 May 2012, 23:20 GMT]
Saving genocidal state of Sri Lanka as a continuity of the long European colonial order in South Asia has now become an obsession with India and the USA, more than the Sinhala nation. From Congress-BJP-CPM to VCK in India, and from hijacked sections of the diaspora in North America to London, the orchestration is to make the genocide-affected Eezham Tamils to denounce their right to protection, right to self-determination, and most importantly their right to call themselves a nation. Sumanthiran’s TNA, instead of working for an alternative secular state in the North–East, only mumbles the gagged situation in between the lines in the presence of Indo-US diplomats in Jaffna. The diaspora still don’t know where to address the issue. Law lecturer Guruparan Kumaravadivel in Jaffna on Sunday aptly brought out the unworkability of India-conceived 13 Amendment.

The real culprits of the genocidal war are now out to handle the situation directly.

Right from leading KP into the hands of Gotabhaya, and instructing the TNA in captivity to denounce independence in the election manifesto, the effort of the real culprits was to absolve them from the crimes and at the same time to achieve their agenda.

The call of the US Asst. Secretary of State Robert Blake for ‘new leadership’ to emerge among Tamils to handover ‘devolved’ powers within a united Sri Lanka became the lure for many, thinking that they are the ‘articulating elite’ in the island and in the diaspora to get hijacked.

If the USA and India are not seeing the fundamentals of a nation needing protection and self-determination, then it is not the ‘new leadership’ of submission, but there will emerge only a new resistance democratically and directly targeting the real culprits, commented new generation political circles in the island, expressing their contempt to what the gagged TNA is doing in the island and what the diaspora is doing especially in North America and in London.

In a development in the last couple of days, the VCK leader Thirumavalavan in Tamil Nadu, who earlier gave a memorandum to his alliance leader Sonia Gandhi to resolve the issue of ‘Sri Lankan Tamils’ through implementing LLRC recommendations, has now announced that he sticks to Tamil Eelam and would work for it.

Guruparan Kumaravadivel
Guruparan Kumaravadivel
Meanwhile, speaking at the TNA meeting in Jaffna on Sunday in the presence of Indo-US diplomats, Jaffna University law lecturer Guruparan Kumaravadivel brought out a dissection analysis of the 13 Amendment in showing how it would never work in the island.

His analysis in Tamil is produced herewith for those who still think that there is ‘some thing’ in it for the plight faced by Eezham Tamils.








Chronology:


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திங்கள், 7 மே, 2012

USA answerable to ‘ethics and efficacy’ in architecting, abetting genocide

USA answerable to ‘ethics and efficacy’ in architecting, abetting genocide

[TamilNet, Monday, 07 May 2012, 02:19 GMT]
John O. Brennan, Assistant for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism to the US President, addressing the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars on 30 April on “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy,” was defending the US tactics in its ten years of ‘success story’ in countering ‘terrorism’ culminating into victories in Obama’s times. Brennan was earlier Deputy Executive Director of the CIA. Presiding his presentation, senior Democrat Jane Harmane of the Wilson Centre, who was earlier a member of the Congress Commission on Terrorism as well as its House Intelligence Committee, said “we won’t defeat those threats by military might alone, we must win the argument.”

Brennan’s presentation on the US counterterrorism and the discussions that followed it were entirely harping on Al-Queda, Bin Laden, and countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Nigeria, Mali Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey. Later the discussions turned towards Syria.

Eezham Tamils may be relieved to note that they have slipped from the US memory of its decades long ‘success’ stories. But it only shows that the application of the US ‘ethics and efficacy’ on the question of Eezham Tamils proved wrong and it became an indefensible shame to hide under the carpet.

The entire world now knows that the Vanni War that ended in the genocide was architected in the USA under its counterterrorism paradigm of the last decade.

The USA has not so far explained what ethics were there in showing its efficacy not only in enacting the genocide against the nation of Eezham Tamils, but also in continuing it in terms of a structural genocide against that nation. The Eezham Tamils have never challenged the USA in any way.

Unless the answers are not forthcoming and remedies are not met with, whatever the counterterrorism dons in the USA say has no credibility and will not win the argument, commented an Eezham Tamil politician in the island.

If the USA doesn’t mend its mistakes on the wrong application of ‘ethics and efficacy’ on the national question of Eezham Tamils, and is not seen that it has genuinely mended its ways, whatever Brennan has said last week could very well be an address of Rajapaksa as well, the politician commented further.

External Links:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: The Efficacy and Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy