Posted on : 11-10-2011 | By : tnn | In : eelamnews
Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa visited Jaffna on January 10, his first visit there following the end of the war. While there he made several announcements, including that the high-security zones in the Jaffna peninsula would be dismantled, leaving only what was described as a “defence front line”. Approximately 42 square kilometers in the Jaffna peninsula have been closed off as high security zones for a number of years, with some 80,000 persons displaced as a result from their homes and agricultural lands, US diplomatic cables on Wikileaks allege.
Read the full cable below;
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000021 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB RELEASABLE TO: UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND SWITZERLAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2020TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CESUBJECT: SRI LANKA – ELECTIONS UPDATE NO. 6 REF: A. COLOMBO 11 ¶B. COLOMBO 7 ¶C. COLOMBO 2 ¶D. 09 COLOMBO 1152 ¶E. 09 COLOMBO 1145 ¶F. 09 COLOMBO 1139 COLOMBO 00000021 001.8 OF 003 Classified By: CHARGE VALERIE C. FOWLER. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D) Fonseka’s Manifesto ——————- ¶1. (C) Presidential candidate Sarath Fonseka released hiscampaign “manifesto” on January 7, a full-color 22-pagebrochure, which contained a strong condemnation of PresidentRajapaksa, largely on grounds of corruption and familypatronage. Post contacts have said the manifesto would bepublished in all three local languages and widelydistributed. The manifesto talks about “believable change”and contains promises on economic reform, government reformand social welfare improvements. As detailed below,Fonseka’s publication is rather thin on explanations of howhe intends to pay for many of the economic and social-welfareinitiatives he promises. There are a number of othergovernmental reforms, however, which could be implementedwith little or no financial burden on the government.Whether or not a victorious President Fonseka would have thepolitical capital needed to achieve these reforms remains tobe seen and would be dependent on a compliant parliament.With parliamentary elections due within several months, theexact shape of any future Fonseka-era parliament is far fromclear at present. KEY PROMISES ———— ¶2. (C) The Fonseka manifesto promises a number ofgovernmental reforms, which if carried out would appear to atleast begin addressing many of the major concerns held by theinternational community and human rights groups.Specifically Fonseka promises to (a) abolish the ExecutivePresidency, (b) reactivate the 17th amendment to theconstitution, (c) end the culture of “white van”disappearances and extra-judicial killings, (d) eliminate thepress council and establish an environment of free media, (e)return all remaining IDPs and double the resettlementallowance they receive to 100,000 rupees ) about USD$880 )per family, (f) amend the emergency regulations, and (g) dealwith all war-related detainees by either prosecuting them,releasing them or placing them in rehabilitation programs. FONSEKA THE ECONOMIST? ———————- ¶3. (C) The economic portion of Fonseka’s manifesto containspositive points on corruption and GSP plus, but more populistpositions on salaries, product prices and taxes. Fonsekapromises to appoint a powerful agency to combat fraud andcorruption, create an independent commission to audit publicfinances, and pass a new Parliamentary ethics code. Fonsekaalso promises to ensure that the European Union would notrevoke their GSP plus trade benefits, but without disclosinghow he would achieve this. Fonseka makes populist appeals bypromising to increase government salaries by 10,000 Rs ($88USD) per month. Rajapaksa countered with a promise of a2,500 Rs ($22 USD) raise. Fonseka promises to providepensions for agriculture and fishery workers. Fonseka plansto reduce the fixed prices of certain items and to bring downthe price of food, diesel and kerosene and other essentialsby reducing taxes. COLOMBO 00000021 002.8 OF 003 COST OF CORRUPTION ) THANKS TO USAID ———————————— ¶4. (C) One portion of Fonseka’s argument on corruption citesstatistics from a study partially funded by a USAID grant,entitled “Impact of Corruption on Poverty and EconomicGrowth, 2007″. The manifesto does not mention the role ofUSAID in that study, and it is unknown whether Fonsekahimself is aware of that connection. The report states thatloss to corruption in 2006 amounted to about 9 percent of the2006 GDP of Sri Lanka. HOW WILL HE PAY FOR IT? ———————– ¶5. (C ) Candidate Fonseka’s economic manifesto coincideswith the economic strategy described in reftel C. Fonsekadoes not mention any real reforms except on corruption andtransparency. His promises to increase salaries, lower thecost of living and cut taxes sound good, but he does notprovide any credible plan to accomplish these goals. In sucha heated campaign environment, it is not surprising thatFonseka’s economic manifesto reveals more of his campaignstrategy than an economic program following the election. WHAT ISSUES WILL DRIVE THE VOTERS? ———————————- ¶6. (C) It is unclear how many votes this manifesto willgarner. The language used in it is very professional andnuanced, and the arguments on corruption appear convincing,especially when coupled with other documents floating aroundSri Lanka’s e-mail network which detail the corrupt financialdealings of the Rajapaksa family. Post is sending localstaff into the field to get a sense of the political moodoutside of Colombo and will draw from that reporting inupcoming elections-related cables. So far voters seemlargely interested in economic matters and care much lessabout security-related issues than they may have some sixmonths ago when the war was still fresh on everyone’s minds.While Fonseka may be short on specific s for his economicplan, it nonetheless is more detailed than the Rajapaksa planthus far, and his attacks on the cost of the Rajapaksas’corruption may well resonate. RAJAPAKSA IN JAFFNA “END TO HIGH-SECURITY ZONES” —————————- ¶7. (C) President Rajapaksa visited Jaffna on January 10, hisfirst visit there following the end of the war. While therehe made several announcements, including that thehigh-security zones in the Jaffna peninsula would bedismantled, leaving only what was described as a “defencefront line”. Approximately 42 square kilometers in theJaffna peninsula have been closed off as high security zonesfor a number of years, with some 80,000 persons displaced asa result from their homes and agricultural lands. It wasunclear when this would take effect, and one media outlet hadreported some IDPs had already attempted to enter one zone,only to be turned back because the formal authorizationremoving the high-security zones had not yet been received.Sarath Fonseka had promised he would eliminate allhigh-security zones if elected when he was in Jaffnacampaigning on January 2. RAJAPAKSA PROMISES RELEASE OF SOME DETAINEES ————————– ¶8. (C) While in Jaffna, Rajapaksa told the local Catholic COLOMBO 00000021 003.6 OF 003 Bishop that all LTTE suspects held on minor charges would bereleased, pending a review of their case by the AttorneyGeneral’s office. Local media had been reporting over theweekend that some 700 of the ex-LTTE combatants held inVavuniya since the end of the war had been released. Postcontacts said by January 11 they were still waiting for aformal court order allowing their release. RAJAPAKSA MANIFESTO ——————- ¶9. (C) President Rajapaksa released his own manifestodocument on January 11. Post will report in more detail inthe next elections update cable once a full englishtranslation is obtained, but early reports are that thedocument is less specific in its promises when compared withFonseka’s manifesto. COMMENT: WHO WILL WIN? ———————– ¶10. (C) This election is still very much up in the air.Polls here are very scattered and likely to be statisticallyunreliable, but anecdotal evidence shows a growth in supportfor Fonseka. Rajapaksa still has an enormous advantage inhis illegal use of state resources, but the idea of “change”is becoming the issue of the day, even if Fonseka has not yetprovided specifics on how to achieve all his promises ofchange. Initial contact with voters in rural areas shows afocus on economic issues rather than security. COMMENT: IF FONSEKA, WHAT NEXT? —————————— ¶11. (C) Some local political analysts have begun to entertainscenarios of what might happen in the Sri Lankan governmentif Fonseka did win. Early opinions say that the wide-spreadUNF coalition he has assembled had no intention of stayingtogether for parliamentary elections. Indeed Post localpolitical staff are finding that local political organizers,in particular those from the JVP, are squirreling awaypresidential campaign funds to use for their ownparliamentary campaigns. The JVP is showing itsorganizational strength on the ground and is likely tobenefit in general elections. Some are saying that ifRajapaksa loses, his family’s fortunes in the SLFP will end,and it will revert back to its more historic form. Rumorshave cropped up in the past week that former PresidentChandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga may announce her supportfor Fonseka, with her son Vimukthi Kumaratunga at her side.This then would serve as Vimukthi’s entrance into thepolitical world, and a passing of the torch to the nextgeneration of the Bandaranaike family, which has been deeplyinvolved in Sri Lankan politics for some 300 years.Interestingly, Mangala Samaraweera, seen by many as thebrains behind Fonseka’s campaign strategy, also ranChandrika’s presidential campaign and was known as one of herclose confidantes. He is thought by some to be a possiblecandidate for Prime Minister in a Fonseka administration.End Comment.FOWLER
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